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Cable Television and Copyright Royalties
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Teleprompter' the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that CATV2 owners who imported
"distant signals' 3 infringed the copyright of copyrighted material on
those signals. In reaching this judgment the court distinguished Fort-
nightly v. United Artists,4 which held that the CATV services there
involved did not infringe copyright. Both courts, however, relied on a
similar judicial approach: In finding an infringement the Tele-
prompter court appropriated the "functionalist" test of the Fortnightly
decision.
Arguably, the outcomes of the two cases are not inconsistent and
Fortnightly should be distinguished as that case had itself distinguished
seemingly forceful precedents. This Note presents another view: that
the Teleprompter outcome represents an anomaly, bred by a series of
awkward results, themselves the result of inappropriate judicial meth-
odology.
I. CATV and Copyright
The common industry practice of selling programs to the largest,
most lucrative markets and only later to smaller, outlying communi-
1. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir.
1973), aff'g in part and rev'g and remanding in part 355 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973) (Sup. Ct. docket no. 72-1628 and no.
72-1633, cases consolidated for argument).
2. CATV is the acronym for Community Antenna Television. The literature on
CATV systems is extensive. The Office of Telecommunications Policy has prepared a
lengthy bibliography. Executive Office of the President, Cable Television Bibliography,
Feb. 1972. Noteworthy are the FINAL REPORT Of President Johnson's TASK FORCE ON
COMMssUNICATIONS POLICY (1968) and R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION (1972).
3. The term "distant signals" has been defined in at least three ways: a signal re-
broadcast without relay which cannot be clearly received; a signal whose pickup does
not add appreciably to the size of the broadcast advertising market; and a signal re-
ceived beyond the Grade B contour. The Grade B contour of a television station
is the boundary of a hypothetical area at whose outer limits television reception of
"a quality acceptable to the median observer" is expected to be available at least 90
percent of the time at the best 50 percent of the receiver locations, based on ex-
pected field intensities and certain assumptions as to the nature and height of the
receiving antenna and the capabilities of the television set. 47 C.F.R. § 73.684 (1972). Since
television transmission travels only on line of sight, topographical conditions will af-
fect the Grade B contour. When not set apart by quotation marks, the term distant
signals is used in this Note in a nontechnical sense to mean signals from a distant place.
4. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), rev'g
377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), and 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
5. See p. 561 infra. In Fortnightly the Court compared the functions of CATV
systems with those of broadcasters ("performers") and viewers ("nonperformers").
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ties depends on the present scarcity of television distribution. The
plaintiffs in Fortnightly and Teleprompter challenged the right of
cable owners to deliver by wire, without private licenses, broadcast
copyrighted material. They claimed that since cable enlarged the pres-
ent distributive market, it restricted the potential future market, there-
by denying copyright owners future syndication sales to areas that,
absent CATV, would be unable to receive the broadcast programs. 6
Beyond loss of royalties, the CATV copyright litigation evidences the
challenge CATV technology represents to the economic hegemony of
the networks. Network television's economic interest in a limited num-
ber of channels conflicts with the development of the CATV industry.7
This more general controversy has been fought on many fronts and in
many forums;8 the copyright cases in the courts are part of this larger
struggle.
6. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. at 180-81;
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 355 F. Supp. at 620.
7. Comments of the U.S. Dept. of Justice before the FCC, Dkt. No. 18,397, at 21
n.l1 (1969) (investigation of ownership of CATV by broadcasters and other media
interests).
8. Congress has not spoken directly to the controversy created by transmission by
cable systems of broadcast materials which have been copyrighted. In 1968 the Supreme
Court noted:
A revision of the 1909 Act was begun in 1955 when Congress authorized a pro-
gram of studies by the Copyright Office. Progress has not been rapid. The Copy-
right Office issued its report in 1961. Register of Copyrights, Report on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, House Judiciary Committee Print, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (MI6l). Revision bills were introduced in the House in the Eighty-
eighth Congress and in both the House and the Senate in the Eighty-ninth
Congress. See H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6835
before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); Hearings on S. 1006 before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). H.R.
4347 was reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 2237,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), but not enacted. In the Ninetieth Congress revision
bills were again introduced in both the House (H.R. 2512) and the Senate (S. 597).
The House bill was again reported favorably, H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), and this time, after amendment, passed by the full House. 113 Cong.
Rec. 9021. The bill as reported contained a provision dealing with CATV, but
the provision was struck from the bill on the House floor prior to enactment.
The House and Senate bills are currently pending before the Senate Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights.
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396 n.17 (1968).
Since that time no revision containing language relevant to CATV has been success-
fully reported to the floor.
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) support of CATV has been tepid. In
December 1968, it lifted a previous ban on distant signal importation in the largest
100 markets for CATV owners who obtained retransmission consent from the holders
of program copyrights. Second Report and Order on Community Antenna Systems, 2
F.C.C. 2d 725 (1966). "[B]ecause of the fees set by copyright owners, for which cable
systems were not otherwise liable, and because of alleged difficulties of obtainingpermissions, the practical impact of these rules was to freeze signal importation at
existing levels." Comanor & Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The FCC and Cable
Television, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 177, 183 (1972).
In 1970, the FCC proposed new rules for CATV. Cable systems were permitted to
import signals from distant stations into the largest 100 markets; those systems with
more than 3500 subscribers were required to originate programming, the amount to
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Some commentators9 have seen the issue more starkly: CATV, by
making money transmitting signals broadcast by others, is getting a
"free ride" if not held accountable for royalties.10 The controversy
might also be seen as one of regulation, since the copyright determina-
tion will structure industry-wide practices. In either case an approach
which involves an extensive analysis of the economics of CATV opera-
tions is required."
A. Community Antenna Television
Cable technology, like boosters12 and translators, 13 originated to
serve communities that could not receive adequate television service
because of topographical features and economic conditions. Contempo-
rary cable technology, advanced by one significant technical innova-
tion, still serves this initial purpose. The CATV owner builds an an-
tenna closer to the major market or on top of the intervening moun-
tain and amplifies the strength of the signal received to send it by wire
to subscribers. The cable technology revolution which permitted the
efficient provision of such service was the use of microwave links to
relay signals from the cable antenna, enabling even the most isolated
areas to receive network broadcasts.
Roughly contemporaneous with this technological advance came a
newer role for CATV. Scarcity of channels restricted not only delivery
but also programming; the economics of production and advertising
precluded programming diversity in most markets. Cable technology
be determined by the size of the subscription audience. Memorandum Opinion & Order,
23 F.C.C. 2d 825 (1970).
In August 1971 the FCC filed a Letter of Intent (Cable Television Proposals) with
Congress, revising the 1970 rules. 31 F.C.C. 2d 115 (1971). CATV systems in the largest
100 markets were to be restricted to importing two distant stations. The final
rules required origination of local programming, Cable Television Report and Order,
36 F.C.C. 2d 141 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Order]; included a provision (the obli-
gation of carriage rule) requiring compulsory carriage of local stations, including
those beyond the Grade B contour where the Commission found that the signals
were "significantly viewed," Order, 74, at 170-71; as later amended, limited distant
signal importation into small markets, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Recon-
sideration, 36 F.C.C. 2d 326, 41, at 342 (1972); and restricted CATV systems from im-
porting signals that would conflict with local exclusivity agreements.
The FCC has, at present, no stated policy on whether CATV systems should be
held liable for copyright licensing fees.
9. See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICtrIONS,
ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE chs. 5, 7 (1971).
10. Plaintiffs need not prove that defendants actually profited in order to collect
damages for an infringement. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.,
344 U.S. 228 (1952); M. NIMIER, COPYRIGHT § 154.13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NIMMIER].
11. See § III infra for examples of analysis that determines (a) whether markets are
in fact diminished, and (b) whether the impact of an adverse decision on CATV would
greatly limit the dissemination of copyrighted material.
12. See 47 C.F.R. § 74 .801(a) (1972).
13. See 47 C.F.R. § 74.701(a) (1972).
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permitted delivery to smaller markets of programming financed by
mass advertising in the major markets.
Both broader delivery and program diversity, however, depend on the
importation of distant signals .4 Microwave relay of distant signals,
which until recently was prohibited by the FCC,1' is a necessity if a
greater number of programs is to be brought to any but the largest
markets. As Professors Noll, Peck, and McGowan concluded, "Cable
holds the promise of all but eliminating the scarcity of channels that
accounts for so many of the problems of television-restricted program
choice, limited diversity, and highly concentrated control. . . .Carry-
ing distant signals is a necessary condition for nationwide cable."'
Indeed, about half of the 650 CATV systems providing full network
services for 2.3 million persons are dependent on distant signals.' 7
B. The Copyright Act
The primary policy of the Copyright Act is to give the public maxi-
mum access to the author's work; a secondary purpose is to remunerate
14. This, at least, is the present state of affairs. It is possible that mass sub-
scriptions, combined with the sale of advertising, would allow profitable CATV pro-
duction origination. The data, however, indicate that achieving a large subscription
audience initially may depend on signal importation. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J.
MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 155 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as TELEVISION REGULATION].
15. The new rules which took effect March 31, 1972, permit CATV to carry two
distant signals into most of the largest 100 markets. 37 Fed. Reg. 3252 (Feb. 12, 1972).
See Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, supra note 8. Previously
such signal importation was effectively barred. See generally Park, Cable Television,
UHF Broadcasting, and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 207 (1972).
16. TELEVISION REGULATION, supra note 14, at 151. This excellent work is one of a
number of papers treating the issue of signal importation from policy perspectives sup-
plemented by economic analysis. RAND Corporation has sponsored a series of such
studies: L. JOHNSON, THE FUTURE OF CABLE TELEVISION: SOME PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL
REGULATION (1970); L. JOHNSON, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE QUESTION OF PROTECTING
LOCAL BROADCASTING (1970); R. PARK, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH ON TELE-
VISION BROADCASTING (1970); R. PARK, CABLE TELEVISION AND UHF BROADCASTING (1971);
R. PARK, PROSPECTS FOR CABLE IN THE 100 LARGEST TELEVISION MARKETS (1971). See
Barnett & Greenberg, Regulating CATV Systems: An Analysis of FCC Policy and an
Alternative, 34 LAW & CONTEMI'. PROB. 562 (1969); Barnett & Greenberg, On the Econom-
ics of Wired City Television, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 503 (1968); Barnett & Greenberg, A
Proposal for Wired City Television, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 1; Barnett, Cable Television
and Media Concentration, Part I: Control of Cable Systems By Local Broadcasters,
22 STAN. L. REV. 721 (1970); Comanor & Mitchell, Cable Television and the Impact
of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 154 (1971); Fisher, Community
Antenna Television Systems and the Regulation of Television Broadcasting, 56 AM.
ECON. REV. 320 (1966); Fisher & Ferrall, Community Antenna Television Systems and
Local Television Station Audience, 80 Q.J. ECoN. 227 (1966).
17. 42 TELEVISION FACrIBOOK, SERVICES VOLUME 75(a), 363(a), analyzed in Brief for
Petitioner at 6, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973) (Sup. Ct. docket no. 72-1628). If the Second Circuit's
definition of "distant signal" in Teleprompter (see pp. 563-64 infra) is correct, the
number may be considerably larger, because the figures given in the text do not in-
clude those systems which do not use microwave relay but may have antennas outside
the CATV community. There is, however, no industry-wide data available on antenna
location.
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the copyright owner.'8 The Act therefore does not grant a general copy-
right monopoly but instead confers specific rights0 and, by inference,
delineates specific infringements °20 Unrevised since 1909, the section
of the Act relevant to the question of potential infringement by CATV
grants copyright owners the exclusive right, among others, to "per-
form" the copyrighted material.2 ' All the decisions in the Fortnightly
18. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)
(The primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but is rather to secure
"the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
19. The Copyright Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title,
shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;
(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make
any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a non-
dramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a
drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and
finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art;
(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work
in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermion, address or similar production, or
other nondramatic literary work; to make or procure the making of any tran-
scription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any
manner or by any method be exhibited, delivered, presented, produced, or repro-
duced; and to play or perform it in public for profit, and to exhibit, represent,
produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever. The
damages for the infringement by broadcast of any work referred to in this sub-
section shall not exceed the sum of $100 where the infringing broadcaster shows
that he was not aware that he was infringing and that such infringement could
not have been reasonably foreseen; and
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or,
if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manu-
script or any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of any
transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in
any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or
reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any
manner or by any method whatsoever; and
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical com-
position; and for the purpose of public performance for profit, and for the pur-
poses set forth in subsection (a) hereof, to make any arrangement or setting of
it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which
the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or
reproduced ....
17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
20. See NihiAiER, supra note 10, § 100.
21. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(c)-(d) (1970); note 19 supra. It would have been difficult
to regard CATV systems as "broadcasting" within § 1(c) of the Copyright Act be-
cause that term is explicitly defined by the Communications Act of 1934 as "the dis-
semination of radio communications intended to be received by the public .... " 47
U.S.C. § 153(o) (1970). CATV systems were held not to be broadcasters in Cable Vision,
Inc. v. KUTV Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. Idaho 1962), vacated on other grounds, 335
F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
Plaintiff copyright owners therefore turned to a series of cases, codified by § 1(c)
(a 1954 amendment), which held that broadcast of copyrighted material constituted a
performance within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v.
American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925) (radio broadcast);
Associated Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1944) (broadcast of a recorded program); Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co.,
59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (broadcast of program received from network).
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and Teleprompter litigations have turned on whether CATV owners
were doing things which could be analogized to the activities of "per-
formers."
II. CATV-Copyright Litigation
A. The Pre-Fortnightly Precedents
The paradigm for "performance" is a stage play production 22 and
the precedents for CATV copyright litigation are cases that compare
early broadcast and reception activities with theatrical performances.
Each case has moved the analogy further and a reading of the prece-
dents prior to Fortnightly is something of a study in the imperceptible
drift from statutory language to incongruous result. This movement
culminates in Fortnightly, which found the Court's majority unwilling
to apply or overrule a compelling precedent.
23
Herbert v. Shanley,24 though not a broadcast delivery case, set the
mold for copyright cases dealing with performance. In Herbert a hotel
operator employed an orchestra to provide free entertainment to din-
ing customers. The Supreme Court held that royalties must be paid to
the holder of the copyright. Following Herbert, a circuit court then
ruled, in Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories
Co. 2  that the unauthorized broadcast of a copyrighted song was a
"performance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
Against this background the Supreme Court considered Buck v.
Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.2 6 In Jewell-LaSalle, a hotel proprietor had
wired his dining room to receive radio programs without authorization
by the local broadcaster. Relying on Herbert and Remick, Justice
Brandeis wrote, "There is no difference in substance between the case
where a hotel engaged an orchestra to furnish the music and that
where, by means of the radio set and loud-speakers here employed, it
furnishes the same music for the same purpose."27
To these cases. was then added Society of European Stage Authors
and Composers (SESA C) v. New York Hotel Statler Co.,28 in which it
was held that a hotel infringed a copyright by providing radio receivers
22. The legislative history of the 1909 Act indicates that a stage play, transcribed
by a member of the audience and then produced, is the paradigm of "performance."
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
23. 392 U.S. at 396 n.18; cf. id. at 407 n.5 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
24. 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
25. 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925).
26. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
27. Id. at 201.
28. 19 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
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in the guests' rooms. The district judge reviewed the above cases and
concluded, "I find that when the owner of a hotel does as much as is
done in the Hotel Pennsylvania to promote the reproduction and trans-
mission within its walls of a broadcast program received by it, it must
be considered as giving a performance thereof .... ,_9The logical out-
come of this process would be to extend the copyright monopoly not
only to bars and restaurants in which television sets are featured,30 but
also to display windows, hotels, car rental agencies-any of the many
businesses which attract or entertain customers, if only incidentally,
with radio or television.
B. Fortnightly and Teleprompter
Fortnightly was the first case to test the applicability of the Copyright
Act to CATV. The Fortnightly company wired homes in Clarksburg
and Fairmount, West Virginia, to receive television signals which the
mountainous terrain blocked. 3' The district court, after an exhaustive
review of cable technology and its relation to the term "perform," held
that there was an infringement.32 Rejecting the view of CATV as an
antenna system, the court noted that home sets (and antennas) do not
create "new carriers for transmissions." 33 Citing SESAC, the court
found great significance in the many technological activities of cable
3 4
which, in its view, rendered the delivered image "not the same" as
those broadcast. It therefore concluded that a "performance" had taken
place.
The Second Circuit, affirming, rejected a conclusion of "perform-
ance" based on an examination of cable technology and echoed the
language of SESAC: "This, we think, is the nub of Jewell-LaSalle and
29. Id. at 4-5.
30. The two major performing rights societies (the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers, and Broadcast Music, Inc.), however, have not chosen to
force the Jewell-LaSalle doctrine to its logical extreme by demanding performing
licenses from commercial establishments, such as bars and restaurants, which operate
radio or television sets for the amusement of their customers. See NIrmsa1ER, supra
note 10, § 107.41 n.204.
31. 392 U.S. at 392 n.4.
32. 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The District Court's decision was based in large part upon its analysis of the
technical aspects of the petitioner's systems. The systems have contained at one
time or another sophisticated equipment to amplify, modulate, and convert to
different frequencies the signals received-operations which all require the in-
troduction of local energy into the system. The court concluded that the signal
delivered to subscribers was not the same signal as that initially received off
the air. 255 F. Supp. at 190-195.
392 U.S. at 399 n.27. This "technical" approach is contrasted with the circuit
court's "quantitative" approach ("how much did the CATV systems do?") and the
Supreme Court's "functionalist" approach to determine what constitutes "performing."
33. 255 F. Supp. at 180, 197.
34. "[They] process, receive, electronically reproduce and amplify, relay, transmit
and distribute [signals]." Id. at 180.
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SESAC: how much did the defendant do to bring about the viewing
and hearing of a copyrighted work?" 35
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting both the district court's tech-
nological approach and the circuit court's "mere quantitative" ap-
proach for a "functional" examination.3" The question asked was not
"Did CATV perform the same kind of electronic activities as broad-
casters?"37 nor "Did CATV do as much as broadcasters do?"38 but "Did
CATV provide the same kind of service, fill the same kind of role as
broadcasters?" 39 The Court found that Fortnightly's CATV systems
functioned more like a passive viewer who erects his own antenna* sys-
tem and less like an "active" broadcaster.
40
Teleprompter was filed the same day as Fortnightly, but efforts to
join the suits were unsuccessful and the former was stayed pending
resolution of the Fortnightly litigation. Plaintiffs' charges of damages
were essentially the same in both suits-that they were deprived of
,licensing fees for uture rebroadcasts. 4' Although the inf!-ingement
theory was modified in light of the decision in Fortnightly, the suit was
clearly pursued as an effort to limit the Fortnightly holding.
In view of the majority's approach in Fortnightly, plaintiffs, the
Columbia Broadcasting System and three production companies, 42 now
alleged that the Teleprompter CATV systems, by virtue of activities
more diverse and sophisticated than Fortnightly's, had become more
"like" broadcasters and therefore more "like" performers.
4 3
35. 377 F.2d at 877. The district court, however, found its "technological" test
implicit in SESAC, where the "quantitative" test originated. The district court con-
cluded that "when a CATV system, for profit, plays so substantial a part . . . [,] the
CATV system must be said to have ['performed']." 255 F. Supp. at 214.
36. 392 U.S. at 396, 397.
37. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("The court holds that . . . the CATV system must be said to have
infringed upon the exclusive right to 'perform' which Congress has bestowed upon
the copyright proprietor . . ").
38. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 879 (2d
Cir. 1967) ("Thus we conclude that defendant's CATV systems did more to bring about
the viewing ... of plaintiff's copyrighted motion pictures than the hotels which were
held to have performed copyrighted musical compositions in Jewell-LaSalle and SESAC
did to bring music to their guests . . ").
39. The Court also contrasted CATV systems with viewers, a class previously held
not to "perform" copyrighted works. Buck v. DeBaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
(Cafe owner could not be enjoined from "picking up," over-the-air, "Indian Love
Call"; Jewell-LaSalle, then on appeal, was distinguished but the ground of decision
seems to have been the court's view of the cafe owner as primarily a "listener.")
40. "Essentially a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to
receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient
connection to the viewer's set." 392 U.S. at 399.
41. 476 F.2d at 342 n.2.
42. The three production companies were Calvada Productions, Jack Chertok Tele-
vision, Inc., and Dena Pictures, Inc.
'43. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that program origination, the importation
of distant signals, the selection of programs, microwave transmission, interconnection
with other CATV systems, advertising, and the sale of commercials, taken together,
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Teleprompter's five challenged systems were chosen as representative
of its nationwide CATV operations; each system typified the CATV
response to different geographical, topographical, and economic situa-
tions, and each exemplified various levels of technological sophistica-
tion.4
4
Rejecting most of Teleprompter's innovations as not involving plain-
tiff's copyright, the district court turned to the issue of distant signal
importation. Plaintiffs had urged that the Fortnightly CATV had
merely "enhanced" the viewer's picture but the court noted that dis-
tance had been a factor in the Fortnightly systems; some of them
brought in signals otherwise unreceivable. Rejecting plaintiff's argu-
ment that Teleprompter was doing something different in kind from
Fortnightly, the court reminded the parties that the Supreme Court
had distinguished CATV systems from broadcasters on the ground that
the former " 'receive programs that have been released to the public
and carry them by private channels to additional viewers.' ,,45 Thus
while the Farmington station in Teleprompter was importing signals
from many miles away40 and thereby enlarging the distant market, so
too, prior to Fortnightly's systems, the neighboring Wheeling stations
could not include Clarksburg or Fairmount in their markets. The dis-
trict court noted the refusal of the Supreme Court to distinguish be-
tween CATV activity within and beyond the Grade B contour 47 and
transformed the antenna systems into broadcasters. 355 F. Supp. at 620. The Supreme
Court has granted petitions for certiorari both to Teleprompter on the "distant signal"
issue and to CBS on the expanded services issues. See note I supra.
The logic of the expanded services issue is interesting: CBS does not contend that the
Teleprompter systems sell advertising on its programs, originate programs containing
its material, or in any way broadcast the copyrighted material. That case would surely
invoke liability. Rather it argues that the use of material, even licensed material, in
broadcasting activities changes the character of the entire CATV system, even with
respect to material not carried as a result of the expanded services.
44. The five challenged systems were: (a) Elmira, New York, a ten channel system;
although it imported at least two signals by microwave, the system served a com-
munity adjacent to larger markets (Buffalo, Syracuse) which were blocked by topo-
graphical features; (b) New York City, a system required by the terms of its franchise
to carry the eleven city stations; while using microwave links between subsidiary
channels, this system did not import signals, offering instead clearer local signals
usually obscured by the height and density of buildings; (c) Great Falls, Montana,
which could not otherwise receive seven of the channels offered by the CATV system
because of distance and mountainous terrain; antennas were located well outside the town
and relayed the received signals by microwave; (d) Rawlins, Wyoming, a system re-
ceiving Denver stations by microwave relay from a cable antenna; topographical fea-
tures required an antenna system even for nearby Casper signals; (e) Farmington,
New Mexico, a nine channel system; none of the stations offered could be received
off the air by Farmington residents, though some of the signals (from Albuquerque)
were amplified by translators; a relay system was thus not essential.
45. 355 F. Supp. at 624-25 (emphasis added) (citing the Supreme Court's opinion
in Fortnightly).
46. They were importing signals from Los Angeles stations 600 miles distant.
47. In an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in Fortnightly, the Solicitor
General had urged a finding that the copyright owners were estopped with respect
to over the air signals within the Grade B contour by a "license implied in law."
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concluded that Teleprompter's systems were simply better located and
more efficient than Fortnightly'.
48
The Second Circuit, Judge Lumbard writing for the court as in Fort-
nightly, reversed.49 The court began by noting that the cable technol-
ogy of Teleprompter was distinct from that of Fortnightly. It rejected
as not determinative, however, each of the technological innovations 0
except one: the importation of distant signals. Judge Lumbard quoted
a footnote from the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. South-
western Cable Co.,51 as authority for the finding that the importation
of distant signals was a technique designed to serve a different purpose
than that served by the Fortnightly system. Speaking in a different
context, Mr. Justice Harlan had written,
CATV systems perform either or both of two functions. First, they
may supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception
of local stations in adjacent areas in which such reception would
not otherwise be possible; and second, they may transmit to sub-
scribers the signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of
local antennae. -
When a copyright owner releases his product over the air, anyone with an antenna
or receiver may pick it up without paying a fee; they are impliedly licensed to do
so by the release through broadcasting. The difficulty with this view is that markets
for advertisers are not determined by line of sight. The Solicitor General's plan
would thus not satisfy the equitable considerations discussed at pp. 568-69 infra. The
Court in any event rejected the Solicitor General's suggestion. 390 U.S. at 401 n.32.
48. If a viewer erected an antenna on a hill, the Court said, he would not be
performing the programs he received. [Fortnightly] at 400. Nor, it would seem,
would a viewer be "performing" if he set up a strategically-placed antenna miles
from his home and brought in signals from that antenna. The fact that the same
operation is conducted here as a commercial enterprise by a viewing innovator
does not change its function-which is to "enhance the viewer's capacity to re-
ceive the broadcaster's signals." We therefore find that Teleprompter's importation
of distant signals does not cause it to function as a broadcaster.
355 F. Supp. at 628.
49. 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. See note 43 supra. Program origination is required under the FCC rules (47
C.F.R. § 74.1111 (1972)). Interconnection and importation of "distant signals" may also
be required, for the obligation of the carriage rule, see note 8 supra, arises "even though a
viewable off-the-air picture is not available in any part of the community." Order,
supra note 8, 42, at 159.
51. 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968).
52. Id. at 163. The point being made in the Harlan opinion, however, is that
this second purpose "promise[s] . . . to provide a national communications system"
and therefore should be within the purview of the FCC. The Court's relevant remark
as to this second purpose came not from the Southwestern majority, but from the
Fortas dissent in Fortnightly. Arguing that a geographical distinction as to the origin
of the off-the-air signal should have been made, Justice Fortas wrote:
It may be, indeed, that insofar as CATV operations are limited to the geo-
graphical area which the licensed broadcaster (whose signals the CATV has picked
up and carried) has the power to cover, a CATV is little more than a "cooperative
antenna" employed in order to ameliorate the image on television screens at home
or to bring the image to homes which, because of obstacles other than mere
distance, could not receive them. But such a description will not suffice for the
case in which a CATV has picked up the signals of a licensed broadcaster and
carried them beyond the area-however that area be defined-which the broad-
caster normally serves.
392 U.S. at 407.
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The court concluded, "When a CATV system is performing this sec-
ond function of distributing signals that are beyond the range of local
antennas, we believe that, to this extent, it is functionally equivalent
to a broadcaster and thus should be deemed to perform the program-
ming distributed." 3 The court therefore held that the three systems
which placed antennas several miles away from the communities they
served and relayed the signals had infringed the copyright.r
4
III. Judicial Method in the CATV-Copyright Controversy
Although five different courts have reached three different conclu-
sions regarding CATV copyright infringement, all have approached the
problem in the same manner-analogizing cable activity to recognized
instances of performance. Each has renounced any effort to take a
broader, policy-oriented approach. Each has felt that a policy deter-
mination is for Congress to make. 55 It is, of course, always risky to infer
anything from congressional inaction, but it would seem that Congress'
continuing refusal to alter the Copyright Act to address the CATV
issue should prompt the Court to take a broader view; otherwise the
relevant economic and policy inquiries will never be made. If Congress
had passed a statute saying "CATV systems must pay copyright fees,"
of course, there would be little inquiry required of the courts. When
the statute speaks vaguely and broadly, however, courts should take a
carefully informed view of the case to which the statute is to be ap-
plied.5 16 Only contemporary legislation that itself reflected such inquiry
should preclude a policy-oriented view.
53. 476 F.2d at 349.
54. The court remanded in the case of Farmington, see note 44 supra, for a de-
termination of whether pickup was possible without relay. 476 F.2d at 353. The court
added the caveat that, if authorized translators could bring the "distant signal" into
the community without relay, transmission even by relay-CATV would not amount to
an infringement. Id. at 350 n.17.
It is unclear how the presence of translators would alter the "function" of a CATV
system or remunerate copyright owners. The translator exception seems more suited
to a license in law theory, since the broadcaster-licensee has made the material avail-
able over the air, but this theory was expressly rejected by the court. Id. at 352 n.18.
55. In the Fortnightly litigation, see 390 U.S. at 401 ("We decline the invitation [to
take a broader policy view]"); 377 F.2d at 885 ("We agree that it is evident that CATV
raises many serious problems of public policy, which are not adequately illumined
by the record before us. . . . We must, however, decide the issue before us .... ");
255 F. Supp. at 215 ("The Court notes in passing that, despite the fact that exemptions
from inclusion within the copyright proprietor's performance monopoly may argu-
ably be desirable in certain instances purely on policy grounds, such desiderata are
for Congress and not the courts.").
In the Teleprompter litigation, see 476 F.2d at 354 ("[C]omplex problems not
readily amenable to judicial resolution [are presented] . . . . We hope that Congress
[will act.]"); 355 F. Supp. at 630 ("Perhaps the time has come to cease piling analogy
on analogy and to await word from Congress.").
56. See Chrysler v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed in note 83
infra; note 77 infra.
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At any rate the courts have little choice. It will be shown that the
present analogical approach to this legislation, which involves compar-
ing the disputed activity to those either contemplated by the legislature
or held by the courts to have come within the statute, is inadequate to
the problem and logically unsatisfying.
A. Some Difficulties of Analogical Statutory Construction
Jewell-LaSalle greatly influenced the decisions in the district and
circuit court considerations of Fortnightly. It was distinguished by the
Fortnightly Court as "limited to its own facts."' 57 In an analogical ap-
proach, however, a court may hardly say that a relevant previous deci-
sion is limited to its particular fact situation; indeed, the whole point
of an analogy is to release a precedent from its historical setting and
apply similar reasoning to a dissimilar set of facts. As Justice Fortas
wrote in his dissent in Fortnightly, "If a CATV system performs a
function 'little different from that served by the equipment generally
furnished by a television viewer' [quoting the majority] and if that is to
be the test, then it seems to me that [the Jewell-LaSalle] master radio
set attached by wire to numerous other sets in various hotel rooms
cannot be distinguished. ' 58 Justice Fortas was surely right. A statement
that the use of mechanical "equipment to extend a broadcast to a sig-
nificantly wider public than the broadcast would otherwise enjoy con-
stitutes a performance" is an example of an analogical, "functionalist"
approach. 0
Furthermore, the majority effort to discredit Jewell-LaSalle by inti-
mating that the Court would not have found a "performance" if the
broadcast in that case had been authorized not only ignores SESAC; 60
it also ignores the more compelling point that "the interpretation of
the term 'perform' cannot logically turn on the question of whether
the material that is used is licensed or not licensed."0' 1 Each of the "in-
fringement" judges was quite correct in his final analogy; under this
approach, it was not only consistent but necessary that a cable operation
be a "performance." The operation resembled nothing so much as a
master radio set wiring rented rooms.
This reasoning would just as logically compel successful infringe-
57. 392 U.S. at 397 n.18.
58. Id. at 406.
59. Id., paraphrasing the Jewell-LaSalle holding.
60. The broadcast in SESAC was authorized. Society of European State Authors &
Composers v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
61. 392 U.S. at 407 n.5. This assumes a common view of the word perform. Whether
a performance or a reproduction has occurred cannot, of course, depend upon whether
the material performed, reproduced, or broadcast is licensed.
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ment actions against viewers who erected antennas and charged their
neighbors to watch football games. Analogies derive from the most
recent decisional examples available; they are therefore often far-re-
moved from the original fact situations which gave impetus to the
precedents and may thus have unintended economic consequences.
The Fortnightly Supreme Court majority was not bound by the
logical rigidity of such an analogical approach. Having forsaken strict-
ness by its choice of analytical method, however, its opinion is both
unconvincing and confusing.
While one might have hoped that the Court would simply overrule
Jewell-LaSalle instead of trying to avoid it, the more serious problem
of analysis lay in the Court's method for deciding. The "functional"
test is not very helpful because it depends on the functions one chooses
to consider; these must in turn be compared with "performance." It is
assumed at the outset that the function is not itself strictly a per-
formance.
The Court agreed with the assumption; the CATV systems accom-
plished the same function as the antenna of the individual viewer.
Once Jewell-LaSalle is dodged, however, a circularity arises. 2 The
argument might be better put as a direct admission of reluctance to
hold antenna owners liable. The assumption, derived from precedent
that "viewers" do not "perform,"6 3 is that, with regard to "perform-
ing," broadcasters and viewers have mutually exclusive functions. But
the cases cited do not hold that viewers cannot perform; they hold only
that they do not do so when they are viewing. Therefore the analysis
would be more accurate if the courts analyzed the problem in terms of
"broadcasting" and "viewing." It would not, however, be very helpful,
since when the viewer erects his antenna he is not watching the screen.
If one accepts the problem as one of choice between two exclusive
classes, the members of only one of which "perform," and if one ac-
cepts the choice of classes, the issue still remains undetermined until
one chooses the function. If the function is superior reception, the
CATV system is like an antenna and there is no infringement; if the
function is provision of more programs, CATV is like a distributor and
there is infringement. Most important, as CATV systems add new
functions, the issue must be re-litigated.64 In a new industry the very
62. If the Court, freed from past analogies, may choose its own direction, then
the analogy is not helpful but redundant. Its very choice begs the question: If CATV
is to be compared to any antenna, the decision as to liability has been made.
63. See, e.g., Buck v. DeBaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
64. It has been suggested that if Teleprompter had preceded Fortnightly through
the courts, further litigation would have been unnecessary, for Teleprompter's systems
were more sophisticated than Fortnightly's. Given the slipperiness of the "distant
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raison d'etre of which is expanding technology, the likelihood of ex-
panded services poses a real difficulty. Indeed, it is the issue of ex-
panded service that brought Teleprompter to court.
It is not ironic, but in a way foreseeable, that the same court that was
overruled in Fortnightly used the Supreme Court's functionalist test
to reach the opposite outcome in Teleprompter. Chastened, the court
rejected its own quantitative approach, only to reach the same con-
clusion.
The court distinguished Fortnightly in this way: The Supreme
Court's functionalist test compared the services provided by cable to
those provided by a home antenna; "distant" signals are those which an
antenna cannot pick up without some relay assistance; therefore, with
regard to distant signal importation, CATV systems are serving a dif-
ferent function and the Fortnightly analogy to viewers no longer ap-
plies. 6
It is remarkable how, in the end, the functionalist-comparative ap-
proach resembles the rejected quantitative approach. 6 Might not the
Second Circuit just as easily have stated that, by the added use of micro-
wave links, CATV was doing "as much" as a broadcaster? 7 How would
one determine when a system is doing better, more, or both so as to
be doing something different?
Perhaps the worst aspect of the decision, however, was not the mixed
logic but the holding. Henceforth, only those CATV systems that im-
signal" criterion, this is open to doubt. More important, new techniques are going
to be developed that may have nothing to do with distant signal importation or may
even outmode it. On a "functionalist" theory, each new system will have to be ad-
judged by the courts.
65. In Fortnightly, the CATV system distributed the programs to an audience to
which they would not have otherwise been presented. . . . [The Court] reasoned
that, since a television viewer was privileged to view whatever programs he could
receive using any available antenna, a CATV system should not be deemed a
"performer" for copyright purposes. . . . When a distant signal is involved, CATV
is again distributing television programming to a new audience that could not
otherwise have viewed it. However, in this case the new audience is one that
would not have been able to view the programs even if there had been available
in its community an advanced antenna such as that used by the CATV system. The
added factor . . . is the microwave link. . . . The viewer's ability to receive the
signal is no longer a product solely of improved antenna technology; rather it
results from the system's importation of the signal into a CATV community from
a separate distant community.
476 F.2d at 349-50.
66. The similarity of the various "approaches" is indicated not only in the re-
currence of the quantitative theme; the district court in Fortnightly, whose "technical"
approach was rejected by all, wrote, "The Court is presented with a situation where
the copyright proprietor collects royalties when a local broadcaster makes the electro-
magnetic waves available to the home television set owner but receives nothing when
a CATV system does the same thing." 255 F. Supp. at 214 (emphasis added). Is this
a functionalist approach? The court thought it was employing a SESAC-that is "quan-
titative"-approach. Id. at 209.
67. Microwave relay does involve transmission, but only point-to-point transmission.
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port "distant stations" are to be held liable for failing to obtain
licenses. The court admitted that a "precise judicial definition of a
distant signal is not possible" ' s and was forced to reject the FCC's
definition of such signals because it would encompass homeowner
antennas. 9 The court concluded that "it is easier to state what is not
a distant signal" and defined that as one "already in the community,"
capable "of projecting, without relay or retransmittal, an acceptable
image . . . by means of an antenna erected in or adjacent to the CATV
community." 70 The court added, in a footnote, that this definition did
not apply to signals "rebroadcast" by translators or boosters since they
were "in the community" already without CATV aid. In this instance
it presumably would be immaterial whether the CATV system used
microwave links to bring in distant channels. This emphasizes the
point not only that CATV systems are being compared to broadcasters,
but also that the comparison may depend on what viewers are doing.
7 '
This kind of ruling has a number of shortcomings. It is unpre-
dictable, being based on a technological rather than commercial defini-
tion of "market" or "community" and applied to an area of rapidly
expanding technology. 7 2 It determines immensely important, previ-
ously undecided questions of communications regulation solely on the
basis of an interpretation of the word "perform." The decision is thus
the culmination of the exegetical approach to CATV copyright litiga-
tion: a decision that is both illogical and unmanageable.
It may be argued, however, that there was an unstated rationale
which guided the court. The court may have felt that what was at stake
in the CATV-copyright cases was whether the cable owners should be
allowed to "pirate" signals produced by others, without remuneration
to them, and profit by such a taking. If so, the outcomes in Tele-
prompter and Fortnightly may be plausible. Without market data be-
fore it, however, a court would have little evidence to determine such
plausibility.
If the desired end is remuneration to the copyright owners, then they
68. 476 F.2d at 350.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 351.
71. Id. at 351 n.17.
72. If the Teleprompter court was concerned about the possibility that market size
will not keep pace with audience size (and consequently about a lesser return to the
copyright owner, see 476 F.2d at 342 n.2), then the "distant signal" test should depend
on markets, not antennas. Clarksburg, West Virginia, one of the cities wired by Fort-
nightly, may consider Wheeling its shopping district but the intervening mountains
preclude a clear signal.
Furthermore the "distant signal" test is easily outmoded by more sophisticated an-
tennas. If General Electric develops more sensitive antennas or if satellites bounce
signals into every village, how would the test be administered?
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may have been rewarded in Fortnightly; that is, broadcast revenue will
presumably increase as the local market grows. The Teleprompter
court may have felt, however, that the inclusion of more distant mar-
kets in the CATV system will not be reflected in rising revenue, cer-
tainly not from advertisers appealing to the local audience of the orig-
inating station. Therefore, a rough equity would hold distant signal
importers liable and others not.
Such a rationale does not preclude the thesis of this Note: that a
broader factual and policy inquiry is needed. Indeed this rationale
requires such an inquiry, for it is certainly not clear that copyright
owners will not be rewarded in the "distant signal" case.73 Nor has
there been the kind of inquiry that would allow a court to balance
this hypothetical "equity" rationale7 4 against the restriction on the
development of the CATV industry and the consequent limitation on
its service of the other goal of the Copyright Act: the dissemination
of copyrighted material.
B. A Method for Deciding the CA TV-Copyright Litigation5
1. Is there an infringement?
Had Teleprompter, Fortnightly, or even Jewell-LaSalle been recog-
nized as inappropriate cases for narrow statutory resolution, a funda-
mentally different approach might have been adopted-an outcome ap-
73. See pp. 573-75 infra.
74. In regard to this "equity" issue, which was raised in THE REPORT OF THE SLOAN
COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMNIUNICATIONS, supra note 9, at 52-54, Noll, Peck, and Mc-
Gowan note:
We have several difficulties with this analysis. First, it holds that "program pro-
ducers are entitled to a return from performances of their product" (p. 52). One
can hardly take issue with the principle, but the analysis ignores the likelihood
that the fees of syndication will reflect the advertising value of distant audiences.
Second, it argues that copyright payments place distant signals on a parity with
local origination, which now requires copyright payments from the cable opera-
tors. This ignores the initial payments for broadcast rights made by the originat-
ing station, which should reflect the value of distant cable audiences. Third, the
commission does recognize our concern that copyright arrangements might inhibit
cable development. They state: "Established distributors, in command of desirable
product, will inevitably devise inventive ways of denying programming to such
small entrants as cable installations and UHF stations as a means of retaining
existing profitable arrangements. Effective enforcement of antitrust laws would
minimize the damage from such endeavors" (p. 54). While we hesitate to take issue
with a commission that includes several distinguished lawyers, we observe that the
antitrust laws have done little to improve the access to programming by UHF sta-
tions, a record that does not augur well for their effectiveness in helping cable
operators obtain access on reasonable terms to distant signals.
TELEVISION REGULATION, supra note 14, at 178.
75. For an excellent discussion of the relevance of market data to legal decision-
making see R. POSNER, EcoNo.Mic ANALYSIS OF LAw (1972). For a discussion of outcomes
inquiry, see id. at 1-8; for a brief review of the CATV-copyright controversy (pre-Tele-
prompter) see id. at 161-63.
569
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 554, 1974
proach looking to the purposes of the Copyright Act in the light of
available market data.7" The remainder of this Note suggests how such
an approach may be structured by examining the precedent for the
construction and application of copyright terms in view of public pol-
icy, some pertinent questions about the CATV industry and their rele-
vance to a determination of copyright infringement, and judicial deci-
sionmaking procedures which are in harmony with the characterization
of the cable-copyright problem as one posing novel considerations of
far-reaching economic impact.77
The Copyright Act reserves exclusive rights to the copyright holder,
inter alia, to exhibit, perform, broadcast, produce, and reproduce the
privileged material. Under a strict construction of the language, the
mere copying of any portion of a copyrighted work constitutes an
infringement.
78
However, to encourage the dissemination of copyrighted material
courts have developed the doctrine of fair use: There is no infringe-
ment if the public interest is advanced and the copyright owners' ex-
pected benefits are substantially intact.79 It should be emphasized that
76. When a court, to resolve litigation growing out of a new technological or com-
petitive practice, is called upon to apply a statute passed by a legislature which
could not have foreseen the disputed practice, the incidental effect of the decision
will be to structure industrial practices. Absent agency guidance, the court has two
methodological alternatives: an analogical analysis, comparing defendant's activities to
those previously held within the statute, and an outcome analysis, applying the pur-
poses of the statute with a view toward the economic impact of the decision. This Note
examines one such example of litigation; another example is Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972). In that case the Court was called upon to determine whether computer
programs were patentable. No market material was cited in the decision, which turned
instead upon a meticulous consideration of the technology of computer programming
and whether it was similar to the sorts of technologies usually held patentable.
77. Antitrust litigation, where courts are rendering regulatory decisions directly
rather than incidentally, as in copyright, offers a model for the reading of a vague
statute in the light of technological and competitive innovation where the outcome
of the litigation will ultimately structure industry practice.
This model speaks to the court's role as well as to a method of judicial decision-
making. Referring to the Sherman Act, then-Professor Robert Bork said, "A judge
who feels compelled to a particular result regardless of the teachings of economic
theory deceives himself and abdicates his delegated responsibility. That responsibility
is .. . continually creating and recreating the Sherman Act out of his understanding
of economics and his conception of the requirements of the judicial process." Bork,
Legislative Intent & the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAw 8- ECON. 7, 48 (1966).
With respect to decisionmaking under the Sherman Act, the Attorney General's
Antitrust Committee has said,
"[Economic practices] are subject to more extensive market inquiry .... This
means that their actual or probable market consequences must be determined as part
of the test of their legality. Such determination, in turn, involves resort to economic
analysis." REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANTITRUST CoMITrEE 315 (1955), quoted in
S. OPPENHEI, & G. WESTON, FEDFRAL ANTTrRUST LAwS 76 (1968).
78. See note 19 supra.
79. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 2282 (Ct. Cl. Nov. 27,
1973), rev'g 40 U.S.L.W. 2550 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 16, 1972). In Williams, federal libraries,
particularly those at the National Institutes of Health, were alleged to have infringed
copyrights by duplicating articles from medical journals and distributing them. Con-
cluding that the "challenged use should be designated 'fair,''" the court stated that,
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the purpose of the fair use doctrine is not to protect de minimis in-
fringement, but to promote the distribution of materials.80 Moreover,
the fair use doctrine is entirely judge-made.81
To determine whether the fair use doctrine may be successfully in-
voked, courts will look at a broad range of factual issues-the nature
of the work and the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted
material, for instance-and apply policy considerations.8 2 As a means
of interpreting the term "reproduce," the methodological usefulness of
this doctrine is obvious. Not only does it avoid unhappy results, but
it allows courts to look into a broad array of factors, including the
impact of their decisions.8 3 This sort of inquiry best serves the purposes
of the Copyright Act.
What is needed in the CATV-copyright litigation is an approach
similar to that of the fair use doctrine, one which will enable the court
to look behind the application of a single term to the policies which
will best serve the purposes of the statute. Since the ultimate ruling
will have the effect of regulation, this approach is indispensable. It is
hardly a coincidence that the fair use doctrine, which applies an out-
come analysis usually associated with regulation, has developed in con-
nection with the Copyright Act.
in the face of no prior dispositive decision, it had to weigh a multiplicity of factors.
The most important of these were: that there was inadequate reason to believe that
the plaintiffs were substantially harmed, that medical research would be injured by
holding an infringement, and that there was no legislative guidance in balancing the
interests of science with those of authors and publishers.
80. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (no infringement, although biographical
material was lifted from copyrighted source). See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 42 U.S.L.W. 2282 (Ct. Cl. Nov. 27, 1973), rev'g 40 U.S.L.W. 2550 (Ct. CI. Feb.
16, 1972).
81. See Clapp, Library Photocopying 9- Copyright; Recent Development, 55 L. Lus.
J. 10, 12 (1963):
Fair use has no statutory basis; it is a doctrine which enables the courts to live
with a law . . . that, if interpreted and enforced literally . . . [,] would involve
them in absurdities contrary to the public interest.
82. Note, Infringement by Photocopying, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 137 (1972), discusses some
of the factors courts have considered relevant to fair use claims. For example, courts
have considered the public interest in receiving information about celebrated persons,
see Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (films of
Kennedy assassination copied); the manner in which the material was copied, see
Petre, Statutory Copyright Protection for Books and Magazines Against Machine
Copying, 14 COPYRIGHT L. Sy'vosIuJM 180, 202 (1966); and the purpose for which the
material is copied, see Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541
(lt Cir. 1905).
83. A recent example of a court looking to the possible impact of its decision in
resolving a problem of statutory construction is Chrysler v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In that case the court considered the adverse effects on the
automobile industry of the failure of the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency to grant a one-year extension of the deadline for meeting air pollution
emission standards; such a consideration was not mandated by the statute. Courts
resolving controversies involving cable and copyright face a less demanding task, for
a determination of the impact on CATV is necessary for the fulfillment of the pur-
poses of the Copyright Act.
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In the cable controversy, too, the Court must look at industry prac-
tices and the industry's impact and importance if the purpose of the
statute is to be carried out.84 Although the cases extensively review
cable technology, none of them contains an overview of the cable indus-
try or its relation to the larger communications field. Nor is mention
made (save in Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent in Fortnightly) of the poten-
tial effects of a decision.sa No court has yet recognized the litigation as
part of a larger, economic competition involving a very successful, en-
trenched economic power confronted by a new and superior technol-
ogy. A discussion of some of the factual issues relevant to a determina-
tion of copyright infringement in light of the Act's purposes follows.
Dissemination of the author's product. If cable is to provide a
means for the broader dissemination of copyrighted works, it must be
economically viable. Cost data imply that, to be economically viable, a
cable system in a suburb cannot fall very short of 50 subscribers per
mile of cable. 80 Penetration data8 7 suggest that in areas of median den-
sity, this goal cannot be met without the importation of distant signals.
Noll, Peck, and McGowan emphasize penetration rates for cable sys-
tems offering different viewing combinations and conclude, "[I]n the
absence of distant-signal importation or some other major additional
stimulant to penetration, no more than ten percent of the television
homes in most of the 100 largest markets will subscribe to cable tele-
vision. . . . [D]istant-signal importation alone is sufficient to change
dramatically the likely level of penetration."' 8 More important, most
communities cannot support a cable system unless there is provision
for signal importation. 9 The exclusion of distant signals would thus
result not only in a smaller audience, but also in fewer such viable
systems.
On the other hand, of course, if signal importation jeopardizes the
84. See note 18 supra.
85. Under the Teleprompter rule, CATV systems which receive "distant signals"
have infringed copyrights. A CATV system receives at least 00 telecasts a week on
each channel. At least half of the telecasts will involve copyrighted programs. The
courts have not ruled on the damages for infringement by CATV, but if the statutory
minimum of $250 per infringement were claimed and levied for each copyrighted
program, the potential statutory damages could be more than S2 million per year
per channel on which "distant signals" were received. An estimated 650 CATV systems
with approximately 2.3 million subscribing homes receive "distant signals." Approxi-
mately half are dependent on "distant signals" even for network service. Brief for
Petitioner at 44, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973) (Sup. Ct. docket no. 72-1628).
86. See Comanor & Mitchell, supra note 16.
87. The "penetration rate" of a cable system is the percentage of homes in a
wired community that subscribe to the cable service.
88. T.LEVISION RaEULATION, supra note 14, at 155.
89. Id. at 162.
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financial viability of over-the-air broadcasters, a concomitant result
might be loss of broadcast markets to copyright owners as well as the
dwindling of exposure of the copyrighted material to the public.
There might indeed be some reduction of broadcast audiences:
The effect of widespread signal importation can be roughly ap-
proximated by the existing fragmentary data. Network affiliates
might lose 10 to 20 percent of the cable audience to imported
independent signals. [With 50 percent penetration] . . . the na-
tional loss of network audience and consequently of advertising
revenues [would be] between 5 and 10 percent, with a midpoint
at approximately 7 percent.90
But as far as the copyright owners are concerned, in their role as
copyright owners this loss in no way represents a threat to the goals of
the Copyright Act. A loss of network listeners simply means an increase
in listeners to the imported signals, and, if anything, a net increase in
the total audience for copyrighted works.9' The remuneration to the
copyright owner is discussed below but insofar as present marketing
arrangements are based on American Research Bureau and Neilsen
surveys,"" the equilibrium of gains and losses reflecting imported sig-
nals would not diminish the available breadth of markets or the
amounts advertisers, in the agg egate, are willing to pay. Indeed, the
opposite effect may ensue.
Rewards for the author.93 While copyright owners and licensees (the
producers) sell programming to both networks and independents, the
independents are today primarily a market for reruns. The effect of
CATV importation is to shift audiences from the networks to imported
90. TELEVISION REGULATION 165.
91. While the total audience may not be changed by shifts between channels, it
would be augmented by the delivery of signals to areas which are inaccessible to
broadcasts. Moreover, greater program diversity as a consequence of "distant signal"
importation may arguably attract a greater aggregate audience in areas already served
by broadcast television.
92. ARB (American Research Bureau) and Neilsen surveys are services used to pro-
ject audience size and composition. ARB measures the number of homes viewing the
stations located in particular cities, the total national figure being derived from local
surveys. Neilsen provides national ratings and share-of-audience measures. Both rating
.systems include CATV subscribers in their measure of total audience.
Insofar as these surveys determine advertising rates (as they must for the national
advertiser), CATV's use of off-the-air signals will be reflected in a gain in revenue
to the broadcaster. As the local advertiser becomes more sophisticated, however, it is
doubtful that he will wish to pay for mere audience size when a segment of that
audience cannot respond to his advertising. But see p. 574 infra.
93. If a patent owner, for example, is once fully compensated, he cannot demand
a second royalty. See Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
377 U.S. 476, 498-500 (1964). The Court's argument is roughly parallel to the "license
implied in law" argument discussed at note 47 supra: that the copyright owner re-
leases his rights in the primary license.
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independents. 9 Noll, Peck, and McGowan argue that the loss from
"one set of customers-the networks-could be recouped from another
set-the independents-by raising, fees on the latter in proportion to
their gains in audience." 95 This poses the problem squarely: To what
extent does the enlargement of a market by an increment which is geo-
graphically distant reflect itself in raised revenue to the broadcasting
station and, in turn, to the copyright owner?
Economists Chazen and Ross conclude, "To some extent, compensa-
tion for [imported signals] already occurs because the cable circulation
of the distant signal can serve as a basis for higher advertising charges
by the originating station.... [S]ome of these additional revenues may
find their way back to the copyright owners. [But where the advertiser
is local or keyed to regional interests the net effect is that] it is difficult
to sell distant circulation of a broadcast station for any price approxi-
mating that obtained for the home audience." 96
The reply to this concern is that a shift in marketing will occur once
the practice of signal importation is well established. National adver-
tisers will pay for wider distribution and local advertisers will shift to
affiliates. Even if this fails to occur, moreover, the audience shift is
estimated to be between five and ten percent; such losses are hardly
catastrophic to the program marketer (assuming, as here, that the
CATV system does not black out incoming commercials9 7).
An important factor to be considered in this connection is the in-
dustry practice of granting geographic "exclusives," agreements which
presently prevent a copyright owner from licensing a particular pro-
gram to more than one station within a market for periods from two
to seven years. Unrestricted cable importation would probably under-
mine this practice.98 "Exclusives," however, have puzzled economists.,b,
As the Report of the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications
noted:
It is difficult to see why exclusive agreements are as common as
they are. They diminish the opportunity of the copyright owner to
maximize his returns; they reduce the flexibility of independent
stations.... They deprive the viewer of a large degree of choice.
94. TELEVISION REGULATION, supra note 14, at 175.
95. Id. at 165.
96. Chazen & Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: TI Visible Hand, 83
HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1838, 1839 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The Visible Hand].
97. A CATV system that blacked out incoming commercials could not avail
itself of this argument because it would not be increasing anyone's audience for the
commercials.
98. TELEVISION REGULATION, supra note 14, at 177.
99. See, e.g., The Visible Hand, supra note 96, at 1830-35.
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... Their survival can be laid in part to inertia, and in part per-
haps to the bargaining power of network affiliates and a few pow-
erful local independent VHF stations. 10
Thus, it would appear that copyright owners would in fact benefit
financially if imported signals were permitted and if the geographical
restrictions of "exclusives" were eliminated.
2. If there is an infringement, how should the Court structure its
judgment?
The economic determinations relevant to the CATV-copyright suit
discussed above are requisites for an informed decision; further study
supporting the data here cited would suggest a reaffirmance rather than
a limiting of the Fortnightly outcome. If thorough consideration does
not support this conclusion, however, either because early factual pro-
jections prove inaccurate or because of changing policy judgments, this
factual material, and more like it, must be used to structure an ac-
ceptable outcome. Whatever the solution, the data cited in this Note
are relevant to its shaping. If the Court finds an infringement, it must
carefully fashion its remanding order or risk crippling the CATV
industry.
One consequence of a holding of infringement might be that the net-
works would thereafter exercise a right of license. The profitability of
cable with and without signal importation is an equally relevant in-
quiry in this context. If networks owning copyrighted material refused
to license it or licensed it only at prohibitive prices, CATV would be
virtually eliminated as a competitor to networks. Prohibitive pricing
would be uncorrected by market forces since the dual role of the net-
works (as copyright owners who derive most of their income not from
royalties but from advertising revenue) makes it to their advantage not
to sell licenses to CATV. Without such copyrighted material, most
cable systems would fail.' 0 '
100. THE REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, supra
note 9, at 52. "One explanation for the existence of exclusives is that they create a
market for old movies and television series reruns. With exclusives limiting access to
recently produced programs, stations are forced to dip into [earlier material] to fill
their schedules. Since these programs have extremely low residual costs when resyn-
dicated they are very profitable to the packagers." TELEVISION REGULATION, supra
note 14, at 177 n.33.
But exclusives will not be vitiated by unfettered signal importation if the 1972 Order,
see note 8 supra, remains in effect. There the FCC recommends that no programs
recently syndicated under local exclusive contracts should be imported into any of the
top 50 markets.
101. "[Djespite the high average profits of cable systems, a nationwide system,
involving subscription by more than half the homes, will not develop unless distant
signal importation is permitted on a wide scale." TELEVISION REGULATION 161-62.
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In view of these circumstances the Court could require copyright
owners to license "distant signal" CATV at the same ratio per sub-
scription as the broadcaster pays per capita for its advertising segments.
Such a judgment would eliminate the alleged "free ride" problem and
compensate the copyright owner in proportion to the economic benefit
enjoyed by the CATV operator. Similarly, the FCC, as intervenor,"' 2
could be ordered to require the original broadcaster to obtain a license
for the viewers of the copyrighted material and then sublicense the
CATV operator at the same rate that he is being charged.
10 3
Whether these suggestions would be functional can only be deter-
mined after extensive economic analysis. In hearing Teleprompter,
however, the Supreme Court must contend with an inadequate record
which reflects the inappropriate approach taken at every stage of the
CATV-copyright litigation. It must contend as well with the FCC's
vague policies in this area. Overcoming these obstacles and rendering
an informed and just decision will be no mean task.
One procedural device for overcoming them is suggested by Rule
24 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule allows
permissive intervention "where a governmental . . . agency wishes to
come into a case involving a statute or regulation." 10 4 The relevant
section of Rule 24 was added in 1948. Underlying the amendment is a
concern for cases in which a public agency does not have a claim in the
strict sense of being able to institute an independent suit, but in which
an aspect of public interest with which the agency is officially con-
cerned is involved in the litigation. The federal agency responsible for
formulating and administering the regulations in question is given an
opportunity to advance its opinions; important questions of public law
may thus be settled on the basis of the most informed advice avail-
able.10 5 This official intervention on behalf of the public interest was
also sanctioned by the Supreme Court before the adoption of Rule
24(b)(2) in Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States
Realty and Improvement Co. There the SEC moved to dismiss a
corporate reorganization plan. It was permitted to intervene because
it had "a sufficient interest in the maintenance of its statutory au-
102. See text accompanying notes 104-05 and p. 577 infra.
103. FCC authority for such regulation derives from United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), and Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 406 U.S.
649 (1972).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
105. See C. WRIGHT & A. MIILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1912, at
547-49 (1972).
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thority and the performance of its public duties ... to prevent re-
organizations which would rightly be subjected to its scrutiny."'' 06
It is settled law that CATV systems come within the purview of the
FCC.1u7 Reasoning from the quoted language in United States Realty,
which is codified by Rule 24(b)(2), 08 the Court could, on its own mo-
tion, request the FCC to appear and suggest the correct approach in the
CATV-copyright litigation. The factual inquiry makes clear that the
outcome of the Teleprompter case will have a great impact on FCC
concerns.," The lower court's ruling would not only conflict with FCC
policy requiring cable to carry all signals within the Grade B con-
tour;" ° more important, it would jeopardize the development of an
industry to which the FCC has stated a commitment.i"
If the FCC has not taken the initiative to intervene, the Court
should not delay in asking it to present data pertinent to the problem.
FCC participation would serve the twofold purpose of ensuring that
administrative policies can be effected without unnecessary conflict and
making available agency resources and expert staff.
A second procedural alternative is the invocation of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction helps a
court in determining whether it should refrain from adjudicating a
case until an administrative agency has examined a question arising in
connection with the case before the court." -2 Although primary juris-
106. 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940).
107. See note 103 supra.
108. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 105, Civil § 1912, at 548.
109. Interestingly, the House of Representatives deleted the CATV provision of
the proposed revision of the Copyright Act in order to refer the matter to the In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce Committee which has jurisdiction over communications
matters. 113 Cone. REC. 8598-8601, 8611-13, 8618-22, 8990-92 (1967). In urging deletion
of the CATV provision, Congressman Moore said, "[W]hat we seek to do in this legis-
lation is control CATV by copyright. I say that is wrong. I feel if there is to be
supervision of this fast-growing area of news media and communications media, it
should legitimately come to this body from the legislative committee that has direct
jurisdiction over the same . . . .This bill and the devices used to effect communica-
tions policy are not proper fnctions of copyright." 113 CONG. REc. 8599 (1967), quoted
at 392 U.S. 390, 402 n.33 (1968). These remarks indicate a recognition that the
problem necessarily involves regulation.
110. See note 8 supra.
Ill. If distant signal importation is made expensive, it seems likely that CATV
systems will not develop to fulfill "the long-term promise of cable television . . .
critical to the public interest judgment we [the FCC] have made." Order, supra note 8,
at 165.
112. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction . .. applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within a special competence of an administrative body; in such a case,
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the adminis-
trative body for its views.
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63, 64 (1956).
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diction arguments have not generally been successful, 113 two recent
Supreme Court cases suggest their possible efficacy in the cable litiga-
tion.
In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange," 4 the transfer of an ex-
change seat was challenged on antitrust grounds. Whether there was a
violation of antitrust law depended in part upon a prior determination
of whether there had been compliance with exchange rules. The Su-
preme Court invoked primary jurisdiction because it found the Com-
modity Exchange Commission better equipped to perform the neces-
sary factfinding; 1 the Commission's decision, said Justice White,
would be of "material aid" to the Court.""
Relying on Ricci, the Supreme Court recently reversed a Seventh
Circuit decision, Deaktor v. L. D. Schreiber & Co.," 7 and reinforced
the view that an agency should be consulted when its competence in
the field promises improved factfinding. In Deaktor plaintiff alleged
a cornering of futures contracts in violation of the Sherman Act and
the lower court ruled that no agency policy could insulate such an act.
There, as in Teleprompter, the issue was not whether the agency
should or could determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation, but
rather whether the relevant agency can provide the courts with an
analysis of the industrial practice disputed.118 Thus, viewed as an aid
in the adjudicatory process, rather than as a matter of jurisdictional
confrontation, 1 9 primary jurisdiction offers another means of allowing
the Court to reshape the methods applied to the CATV-copyright liti-
gation.
113. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1972). Invocation of
the primary, jurisdiction doctrine is appropriate not only to preserve the integrity of
the regulatory scheme, but also to take advantage of readily available agency ex-
pertise. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Far East
Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
114. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 447 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 409
U.S. 289 (1973).
115. 409 U.S. at 305, 306.
116. Id. at 305.
117. 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor,
42 U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1973).
118. Such invocation of primary jurisdiction does not represent any abdication of
the court's role; rather it augments the quality and comprehensiveness of the presen-
tation before the court. Courts will still make the ultimate determination.
119. See Antitrust and Regulated Industries-Clarification or Confusion?, 628 BNA
ANTITRUST & TADE REG. REP., at B-i (1973). For further comment on primary juris-
diction, see Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. Rrv. 1037 (1964); Kestenbaum, Pri-
mary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the Al-
location of Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812 (1967); Note, Primary Jurisdiction, 33 Osno ST.
L.J. 209 (1972).
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Conclusion
"Perform" should be considered a term of art; its application in this
controversy should turn on an informed judgment of the impact of an
assignment of property rights. To hold that CATV has or has not per-
formed copyrighted material 'is merely to determine whether or not
liability should attach to this new industrial practice. If this litigation
is not approached with an outcome analysis, important economic deci-
sions will be made without a policy inquiry by any of the decision-
makers. Because the courts have failed to adopt an appropriate meth-
odology in the discussed cases, "common sense" and analogy have de-
termined decisions. Teleprompter should not continue this charade.
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